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RURAL FINANCIAL MARKETS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF BANGLADESH 
by 
D. W Adams and G. 0. Nelson* 
Few countries face more obvious rural development problems 
than Bangladesh. Its per capita income ranks with the world's 
lowest, and ~ts population density with the highest. A current 
population of over 84 million will double in 25 years within an 
area about the size of the state of Iowa. Although primarily 
an agricultural country, Bangladesh has been forced to increas-
ingly rely on food imports even in normal production years. 
Cyclones, droughts, floods, low prices on exports, political 
turmoil, and outflows of trained people add to these problems [9]. 
It is easy to paint a pessimistic picture of Bangladesh's 
development prospects. If history is any guide, however, one 
must be careful not to underestimate growth potential. Only 
three decades ago, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Peoples' Republic 
of China were viewed as international "basket cases". These 
countries are now cited as developmental success stories. 
Taiwan and South Korea both received substantial amounts of 
foreign assistance. But, even larger amounts of foreign capital 
and technical assistance are available to Bangladesh. Furthermore, 
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land and water resources in Bangladesh are superior to those in 
Korea and many parts of the Peoples' Republic of China; typhoons 
in Taiwan blow as hard and probably more often than the cyclones 
in Bangladesh; and population density in many parts of the 
Peoples' Republic of China is just as intense as in Bangladesh. 
Accelerated development in Bangladesh will not be easy, but it 
is clearly not impossible. 
If three decades from now Bangladesh is to be cited as a 
developmental success story, major increases in agricultural 
output and vast improvements in rural well-being will be neces-
sary. The essentials for this rural development are generally 
understood: new crop technologies, better water control and 
management, improved marketing and transportation facilities, 
land tenure changes, production incentives, more education, 
stronger local organizations, and physical availability of mod-
ern inputs. Major increases in the amounts of formal loans 
handled by the rural financial markets (RFMs) also will be needed 
to facilitate expanded production and marketing activities. 11 
Although not a cure-all for rural development problems, agricul-
tural credit programs are receiving, and will likely continue 
to receive, an inordinate amount of attention in Bangladesh. In 
part, this attention will be due to the very small size of the 
current formal rural financial market; many policymakers recognize 
1/ Formal RFMs here are defined as commercial banks, postal sav-
ings, and cooperatives which provide loans as well as the 
Bangladesh Krishi Bank. 
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that these markets must be sharply expanded and strengthened to 
support development. Policymakers and international aid agencies 
also recognize that it is relatively easy to augment loan sup-
plies, adjust nominal interest rates, or institute debt morator-
ium. Other rural development essentials require longer gesta-
tion periods, and therefore have less political appeal. The 
announcement of a new credit program often provides an aura of 
action for beleaguered policymakers and aid agencies. 
In the discussion which follows we assess the recent per-
formance of rural financial markets in Bangladesh, and speculate 
on how this performance might be improved. The discussion opens 
with a brief overview of the agricultural sector in Bangladesh, 
and then goes on to outline the role which rural financial mar-
kets might play in its development. This is followed by a des-
cription of the current structure of RFMs in Bangladesh, and an 
evaluation of how the system has recently performed. We conclude 
the discussion by suggesting several policy changes which might 
improve the future performance of Bangladesh's RFMs. 
Recent Agricultural Development 
While Bangladesh was part of Pakistan, agriculture was as-
signed less priority than the industrial sector. It was not until 
the late 1960's that policymakers focused attention on increasing 
production in agriculture [4]. This was done mainly by increas-
ing the supply of chemical fertilizers and pesticides, and expand-
ing the number of tubewell or low lift pumps for irrigation in 
the dry season. Physical inputs and credit were regularly supplied 
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at concessionary or subsidized rates. The overall production 
effect of these activities was positive. The increase in agri-
cultural output during the 1960's nearly kept pace with the 
increase in population growth. The strategy also had negative 
effects, however, as larger farmers, because of their better 
access to the credit and modern inputs, benefited considerably 
more than smaller farmers and the landless. 
The modest agricultural productivity gains of the 1960's 
were severely disrupted during the first half of the 1970's by 
several catastrophic events. First came the devastating cyclone 
of November 1970; this was followed by the 1971 Liberation War; 
a major drought occurred in 1972-73, and serious flooding was 
experienced in 1974-75. The upheavals in the international 
economy brought about by the "oil crisis" in 1973-74 further 
added to Bangladesh's difficulties. Because of the war, the 
physical infrastructure in the country was severely damaged: 
markets were thrown into disarray, law and order broke down, in-
puts and raw materials for agriculture were scarce, and the 
managerial and entrepreneurial class was depleted through a 
widespread exodus or refugees. 
Bangladesh's First Five Year Plan covering July, 1973 to 
June, 1978 continued the 1960's strategy or intensifying rood-
grain production through use or more improved seeds, expanded 
use of fertilizer, and more irrigation facilities. The supply 
of agricultural inputs was slow to increase, however. Irrigation 
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pumps were often in need of spare parts or fuel, and while addi-
tional capacity for domestic production of urea came on stream 
in 1973-74, the added supply was small compared to the farmers' 
latent demand. New rice and wheat varieties for local conditions 
were being developed at the Bangladesh Rice Research Institute 
but were not yet ready for release, and the organizations needed 
to deliver modern inputs to farmers were disorganized and all 
too often ineffective. The government attempted to relieve this 
by extending the multi-purpose, two-tiered cooperative system 
developed at the Rural Development Academy in Comilla, along 
with creating several other specialized institutions. Also dur-
ing this period the currency was overvalued. This worked against 
agricultural exports. During the 1960's, consumer prices in 
East Pakistan were quite stable, but in the early 1970's infla-
tion began to accelerate. Inflation rates of almost 40 percent 
per year were realized in 1973-74 and 1974-75. Since 1970-71, 
inflation in Bangladesh has averaged about 15 percent per year. 
By 1975, the turmoil resulting from the war began to sub-
side, and gradually the country entered a period of political 
and economic stabilization. Law and order was largely restored, 
and the currency was sharply devalued. Subsidies were reduced 
on fertilizers and on some irrigation schemes, and stronger ef-
forts also were made to remove the bottlenecks to input supplies. 
Total chemical fertilizer use in the country increased two and 
one-half times from 1974-75 to 1977-78, and the number of new 
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shallow tubewells sunk each year over the same period increased 
from 893 to 3,452 [20]. Due to favorable weather, the 1975-76 
crop year was the best since before Liberation and food prices 
dropped accordingly. The government began to give more atten-
tion to agricultural pricing policy and procurement, and it 
eventually established prices for rice and wheat which offered 
stronger production incentives. 
By mid-1978, the production of most major agricultural 
commodities had approached or surpassed prewar levels. Because 
of continued population growth, per capita foodgrain output con-
tinued to lag behind prewar levels, however, necessitating food-
grain imports to meet minimum calorie requirements. By mid-1978, 
jute production was not yet back to prewar levels and, since 
jute and jute products account for more than 75 percent of the 
total value of exports, this lag in production has had a major 
impact on the nation. 
It appears that agricultural development strategy will con-
tinue to focus on expanding foodgrain production with the goal 
of achieving ~ood self-sufficiency by 1985. Policymakers are 
increasingly aware, in the face of growing landlessness and 
shrinking farm size, of the need to pay increased attention to 
income distribution.~ An indication of this is the 100 Crore 
A recent study by Jannuzi and Peach [15] indicated that 11 per-
cent of rural households own absolutely no land, another 33 
percent own a homestead only, and another 15 percent own a 
homestead plus acreage of less than 0.5 acres. 
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Taka Credit Program initiated in 1977 in an attempt to move more 
credit to the rural poor. In this program, loan collateral re-
quirements were relaxed so that landless tenants could take loans 
against their future crops, provided they have the backing of 
the local councilman or their landlords. 
Development Role of Rural Financial Markets 
Policymakers in Bangladesh appear to assign rural financial 
markets a very narrow developmental role [21, 26]. RFMs are 
viewed mainly as one-way channels for moving concessionary priced 
loans to farmers. The general notion behind this is that farmers 
need more formal loans in order to purchase modern inputs such 
as fertilizer, pesticides, new seeds> and water control facili-
ties. While this "production facilitating" role is quite impor-
tant, there are other important roles which RFMs might also play. 
RFMs may strongly influence asset ownership and income distribu-
tion, for example. Only borrowers receive the productive bene-
fits from loan use, realize the "benefits" of loan default, or 
receive the implied income transfer through negative real rates 
of interest. If formal loans are concentrated in the hands of 
relatively few people, loan benefits will be concentrated. This 
role becomes very important when large RFM portfolios are involved, 
default problems are serious, or where real rates of interest are 
highly negative. 
RFMs may also play a role in influencing household activi-
ties which are not directly related to agricultural production. 
Many households, for example, use additional liquidity provided 
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by loans to stablize cash flows and household consumption. 
These so-called "consumption loans" are often thought to come 
mainly from informal lenders. In fact, because money is com-
pletely fungible, any cash loan affects the amount of liquidity 
available to the household. Even loans in-kind can be converted 
to cash through resale of goods borrowed. The additional li-
quidity provided by loans can be used to augment any of the eco-
nomic activities in the borrowing household: e.g., consumption, 
farm investment, nonfarm investment, purchase of consumer dur-
ables, and informal lending. 
Activities in RFMs can also influence the amount of savings, 
as well as the forms in which households choose to hold their 
savings [3]. This is a subtle role which is often overlooked 
by policymakers. As Bangladesh becomes increasingly monetized 
and more people are touched by formal financial markets, this 
role will become more important because of its implications for 
capital formation. In most low income countries, including Bang-
ladesh, RFMs discourage capital formation by offering nominal 
rates of interest on deposits which are lower than expected in-
flation rates. These negative real rates cause households in 
the long-run to minimize holdings of financial instruments. 
The wealthier households often shift savings to land, livestock, 
crop inventories or gold. Poor households are usually unable 
to accumulate sufficient savings to acquire some of these lumpy 
assets. Their only alternative may be to hold cash or small 
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amounts on deposit at negative real returns, or to consume po-
tential surpluses. RFMs may, therefore, affect the form in 
which assets are held as well as the overall amount saved by 
rural households. 
RFMs in Bangladesh should also play the role of intermed-
iary between households with surplus liquid resources and house-
holds and enterprises which lack sufficient liquidity to capi-
talize on economic opportunities. In many low-income countries 
formal lenders do a very poor job of carrying out this inter-
mediary function. Many formal lenders do not accept savings 
deposits, and those that do, often provide savers with very weak 
incentive to save in financial form. On the lending side, for-
mal RFMs are often badly fragmented. Borrowing costs across 
formal lenders only provide loans to producers with specific 
crops or enterprises. Many formal lenders ration loans on the 
basis of so much per unit of area cropped. Under these fragmented 
conditions some borrowers receive too much, others too little, 
and still other credit-worthy individuals are denied access to 
any formal credit. The resulting inefficiencies in resource al-
location under these conditions may be very substantial. 
Structure of RFMs in Bangladesh 
The current structure of RFMs in Bangladesh is the result 
of a good deal of evolution interrupted by political intrusions.}/ 
3/ See [2, 8, 20, 28] for further details on the historical 
- background. 
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Prior to 1900 almost all of the credit in rural areas in East 
Bengal was provided by informal lenders. Occasional distress 
credit known as taccavi loans, authorized by the Agricultural 
Loan Act of 1885, were distributed. These loans, however, have 
most often been treated by both giver and receiver as relief 
payments rather than as loans to be repaid. Post Office Sav-
ings Banks were also opened in some areas in the late 1880's. 
In 1904 the British began to introduce village level credit 
cooperatives in many parts of the subcontinent. These coop-
eratives were largely aimed at substituting for informal lenders 
who were thought to exploit the rural poor. By 1947 there were 
26,664 rural credit cooperatives scattered around East Bengal. 
Because of World War II, the Great Famine of 1943, and the ef-
fects of partitioning, most of these coops were liquidated by 
1957, however. A few surviving credit cooperatives along with 
other new cooperatives and some post savings facilities provided 
almost all the formal financial services in rural areas until 
the late 1950's. Informal lenders continued to provide a very 
large part of all credit needs in rural areas. A national 
study completed in 1956 showed that less than 15 percent of the 
rural borrowers obtained loans from government or cooperative 
sources [8, 57]. It is very doubtful if this percentage is 
much higher currently. 
As might be expected, the depression of the 1930's, World 
War II, and the formation of India and a two-part Pakistan 
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caused extensive turmoil in rural financial markets up through 
1947. Loan repayment problems were severe. Many formal debts 
were restructured or essentially cancelled by political action 
during this period. In addition, many of the non-Muslim money-
lenders left East Bengal as a result of partitioning. This 
further disrupted informal portions of the RFMs. 
In 1948 the East Pakistan Provincial Co-Operative Bank 
was organized. This was followed by gradual liquidation of 
almost all village based credit cooperatives and their replace-
ment by a three tier system with about 4,000 union based coop-
erative societies. Although multipurpose in name, most of 
these societies mainly provided loans. The formal RFM was fur-
ther supplemented by the formation of an Agricultural Develop-
ment Finance Corporation in 1951 and the Agricultural Bank of 
Pakistan in 1957. These two institutions were merged in 1961 
to form the Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan. After 
the civil war this bank was renamed the Bangladesh Krishi 
Bank (BKB). 
As mentioned earlier, a substantial part of the coopera-
tive system has gone through still another major transformation 
during the 1970's. A two-tier cooperative system has been 
developed as part of the Integrated Rural Development Programme 
(IRDP) [27]. This includes Village Agricultural Cooperative 
Societies (KSS) and Thana level Cooperative Associations (TCCA). 
Credit allocation and savings mobilization are important parts 
of these cooperatives' activities. In many areas the KSS and 
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TCCA's are substituting for the earlier formed, union coopera-
tives. In other cases the older cooperatives exist along with 
the new cooperative system. 
Shortly after the Civil War which resulted in the inde-
pendence of Bangladesh, most commercial banks in the country 
were nationalized [2]. Six state-owned commercial banks emerged 
from a consolidation of these banks in 1972. These six commer-
cial banks have been strongly encouraged to service rural needs 
by opening up branches in rural areas, providing loans directly 
to cooperatives, and also expanding their direct loans to ag-
ricultural producers. Overall, the commercial banks and the 
Bangladesh Krishi Bank (BKB) increased the number of bank 
branches in the country from a total of 1,148 in December, 1971 
to 2,742 in June, 1978 [2]. In mid-1972 only 414 of the bank 
branches were in rural areas, but this increased sharply to 
1,594 by mid-1978. 
As can be noted in Table 1, over the past two decades five 
major channels for formal agricultural credit were used in 
Bangladesh. The Agricultural Department of the Ministry of 
Agriculture continued to provide significant amounts of taccavi 
loans throughout the 1960's. Relatively few taccavi loans were 
disbursed in the 1970's, however. The BKB and its predecessor 
agencies have provided roughly one-third of the formal credit 
supply throughout the 1960-1977 period. The BKB also has pro-
vided most of the medium and long-term credit available to 
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agriculture. The Bangladesh Samabaya Bank (BSB), the Apex Coop-
erative Bank, and its predecessor agencies have also provided 
a significant, but declining portion of agricultural credit. 
IRDP credit activities have largely offset the decline of BSB 
lending in the past few years. As can be noted in Table 1, 
commercial banks have become a very important segment of rural 
financial markets since 1973. This is largely the result of 
strong government pressure. 
Recent Performance 
In nominal terms the overall supply of formal agricultural 
credit in Bangladesh expanded erratically from about 95 million 
Taka in 1960-61 to about 865 million in 1976-77. The Civil War 
and substantial amounts of political intrusion caused substan-
tial fluctuations in nominal credit supplies. Very strong in-
flation pressures since 1970 also have eroded a good deal of 
the purchasing power of the formal credit supply. As can be 
noted in Table l, in 1976-77 total purchasing power of the 
formal loans disbursed was only three-quarters of the prewar 
1969-70 period. 
By almost any measure, Bangladesh has a very small amount 
of formal agricultural credit. In 1976-77 the total new loans 
amounted to only about $58 million U.S. In contrast, the Domin-
ican Republic with about 5 million population, approximately 
half living in rural areas, had the equivalence of over $140 
million U.S. in formal agricultural credit in the same period [17]. 
TABLE 1: New Disbursements of Agricultural Loans by Various 
Agencies in Bangladesh 1960-61 to 1976-77 
Agencies2? - -----~--Total in 
YearY 
.Agr1. c. Dept • BSB2 COI!Ifercial Current Total in 
'laocavi BKB and Cooperatives IRDP Banks Taka 1960-61 Prices21 
-In Current Millicn Taka-.o/ 
-1960-61 Taka-
196D-6l 13.5 38.2 ! 43.1 9l!.8 9l!.8 
1961-62 21.5 40.5 45.7 107.7 104.6 
1962-63 29.0 37.7 37.8 lOlJ.5 101.5 
1963-64 38.5 38.3 35.l! 112.2 108.9 
1964-65 30.2 36.5 25.6 92.3 87.1 
1965-66 17.8 41.6 g.4 68.8 61.4 
1966-67 19.0 47.1 23.2 89.3 72.0 
1967-68 15.3 65.0 70.1 150.4 121.3 
1968-69 25.l! 75.8 79.1 180.3 138.7 
1969-70 30.0 100.7 173.3 30if.o 223.5 
1970-71 N/A 69.7 83.5 153.2 106.4 
1971-72 N/A 96.4 96.4 15.8 208.6 126.4 
1972-73 N/A 179.0 142.5 29.0 350.5 143.3 
1973-74 14.6 135.7 77.4 24.6 54.9 307.2 89.3 
1974-75 10.0 176.3 94.1 39.3 76.7 396.4 71.6 
1975-76 .5 185.2 106.2 45.3 134.5 471.7 9l.lJ 
1976-77 .4 388.4 113.3 62.0 301.2 865.3 167.4 
Sources: World Bank, "Bangladesh Land and Water Resources Sector Study," Vol. 6, Technical Report No. 19 -
Agricultural Credit, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, Decenber 1, 1972, Appendix Table 2. 
M. A. Jl'blla Majid, "Institutional Delivery Syst;em or Agricultural Credit in Bangladesh," un-
published paper presented at workshop held in the Bangladesh Bank, Dacca, October 23 to 25, 
1978. 
Robert R. Nathan Associates, "Bangladesh Bank Agricultural Credit Study Project: Phase II 
Report," unpublished study submitted to the Bangladesh Bank, March 10, 1978. 
y July 1 to June 30. 
?f Bangladesh Krishi Bank (BKB); Bangladesh 3amabaya Bank (BSB); Integrated Rural Deve1opllfflt Program (IRDP); 
Sona11 Bank, Janata Bank, Pubali Bank, Agrani Bank, Rupali Bank, Uttara Bank (Co!Tlllercial Banks). 
]I From 1960-1970 figMres include loans made by the cooperative system. 
4/ From 1960 to l97ll one U.S. dollar was worth about 7 Pakistan Rupees (Taka). Since then 15 Taka have 
- been worth about one U.S. dollar. 
5/ For 1960-1971 the ConsUll'er Price Index for Pakistan published by The International Monetary Fund, in 
- International Financial Statistics was used. Data for 1972 to 1977 were deflated by the general cost 
of Living Index for the middle class in Dacca published by the Bangladesh Bank, Statistics Departrrent 






The Philippines, with roughly half Bangladesh's population, made 
new formal agricultural loans in the same period for agricul-
tural production which totaled almost $1,000 million U.S. Bang-
ladesh also ranks very low when the volume of agricultural 
credit is compared to the value of agricultural output in the 
country. Over the 1972 to 1977 period the formal credit port-
folio was equal to less than 2 percent of the gross national 
product generated in the agricultural sector.~ Similar figures 
in the Dominican Republic and the Philippines were around 20 
percent throughout this period. The price concessions which 
Bangladesh gives farmers on fertilizer, pesticides and pumps 
soften this harsh picture a bit. Nonetheless, it is clear that 
the amount of formal credit available in rural areas of Bang-
ladesh is relatively small by almost any measure. It is little 
wonder that informal lenders continue to play such a large role 
in RFMs when formal credit is so scarce. 
Despite the almost complete nationalization of the banking 
system, it appears that the government has had little success 
in directing a larger proportion of credit to rural areas. In 
late 1972 approximately 16 percent of the total value of out-
standing balances on loans made by banks in Bangladesh were for 
agricultural purposes. In late 1976 this had slipped to less 
~ In 1972-73 the estimated GNP from agriculture was 26,600 
million current taka, while in 1976-77 it was 58,303 million 
current taka. 
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than 9 percent.2/ The 100 Crore Taka Agricultural Credit Program 
initiated in early 1977 started to reverse this trend [21]. 
In addition to the overall supply issue, several other un-
satisfactory performance dimensions in RFMs can be readily 
identified, although not adequately documented. In part, the 
overall supply of formal rural credit has failed to grow rapidly 
because of loan repayment problems. Policymakers and aid agen-
cies are slow to push more funds into a credit system which 
does not retrieve a large part of the money lent. Bangladesh's 
history of making distress "loans," political intrusions into 
the repayment process, and the disruption caused by the Inde-
pendence War caused very serious repayment problems from 1970 
to 1973. As can be noted in Table 2, the BKB recovered only 
53 percent of the value of its loans which fell due in 1970-71, 
and only 35 percent of those falling due in 1971-72. Equally 
serious repayment problems were experienced in the cooperative 
system. Since 1973 both the BKB and the cooperative system have 
improved their loan recovery records. The IRDP Cooperatives, 
however, continue to recover only two-thirds to three-quarters 
of the total amount they lend. Part of the improved BKB recovery 
in recent years is the result of repayment of loans which have 
been overdue for several years. Improved BKB repayment per-
centages are also likely due to changes in its lending portfolio. 
21 Bangladesh Bank, Statistics Department, Quarterly Scheduled 
Bank Statistics, March 1973, p. 29 and October-December 1976, 
p. 46. 
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In 1975-76, more than 85 percent of the value of all loans 
made by BKB went to tea producers and farmers purchasing live-
stock. These loans were typically well secured and less risky 
than loans for rice or jute production. It is still an open 
question whether formal RFMs can substantially increase loans 
for production of these commodities typically raised by small 
farmers and small tenants and also maintain satisfactory repay-
ment records. 
As suggested earlier, income distributions can be strongly 
affected by formal loan allocation. Although difficult to pin 
down with available data, it appears that relatively little of 
the funds handled by formal RFMs in Bangladesh have flowed to 
the rural poor [5]. In 1975-76, for example, the Annual Report 
of the BKB showed that less than one-quarter of the total value 
of loans made by the BKB went to farmers who owned less than 3 
acres.§! This proportion was down significantly from the one-
third lent to this group in 1971-72. It is likely that similar 
distribution patterns occur on loans made by the various coop-
eratives. The lament that local elites receive a majority of 
the loans made by cooperatives can be heard throughout Bang-
ladesh [5, 16]. 
Another important element in financial markets is the term 
structure of the loan portfolio. Until recently, the BKB was 
the primary source for medium and long-term formal loans in 
~/ In 1967-68 the average farm in Bangladesh had only 3.1 acres. 
TABLE 2: Loan Repayrrents To The Bangladesh Krishi Bank 1970-77 
Loan Transactions Dur~ar 
Total 
Year I Due Repaid Recovery Percentage! Overdue 
-------(Thousand Taka)----- % (Thousand Taka) 
1970-71 N/A N/A 53 171,226 
1971-72 84,158 29,164 35 226,220 
1972-73 99,386 67,238 68 258,368 
1973-74 161,259 118,991 74 300,636 
1974-75 228,313 199,963 88 328,987 
1975-76 280,187 274,795 98 326,026 I 1-' (X) 
I 
1976-77 317,483 297,362 94 337,866 
Source: Bangladesh Krishi Bank, ADnual Reports, various issues 1971-72 to 1976-77. 
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rural areas. Most agricultural loans in Bangladesh have terms 
of less than 12 months and many are for only a single cropping 
season of 4-6 months. In 1971-72 the Annual Report of the BKB 
showed that about two-thirds of the total value of its loan 
portfolio was in medium and long-term loans. By 1975-76 medium 
and long-term loans made up only 40 percent of BKB's loan port-
folio, and long-term loans made up only one percent. Commercial 
banks and cooperatives have even shorter average term structures 
on their agricultural loans. Not only is formal agricultural 
credit scarce in Bangladesh, but it is also very short-term 
for a country which needs large amounts of investment in farm 
level land and water improvement facilities. 
A few countries like Japan, Taiwan and South Korea have 
been quite successful in mobilizing savings through RFMs [23]. 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to document the amount of vol-
untary savings deposits which originate in rural areas in 
Bangladesh [3]. The sketchy information which is available 
suggests that Bangladesh has not been very successful in this 
regard. At the end of 1976 only 11 percent of the deposits in 
the entire banking sector were in rural branches of the banking 
system.l/ At the end of 1976 the BKB only had savings and 
fixed deposits which amounted to one-third of the total new loans 
it made during 1976-77. The cooperative system had an even 
Interestingly enough, however, these 
posits at the end of 1976 which were 
as large as the outstanding balances 
same rural branches. 
rural branches had de-
three-and-a-half times 
on loans made by these 
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lower savings-deposit-to-loan ratio. As suggested earlier, 
formal RFMs in Bangladesh largely view themselves as retail 
outlets for money provided by the Central Bank.~/ 
Formal RFMs in Bangladesh also appear to be imposing rel-
atively high user costs on some actual as well as potential 
users of deposit and loan services. In the early 1960's, 
Shahjahan conducted a study which reported on borrowing costs 
inc~rred by various classes of borrowers in Bangladesh who re-
ceived loans from the Agricultural Development Bank of Pakis-
tan [30]. During the period of the study the Bank charged 
borrowers a uniform 7 percent nominal interest rate on all 
loans. In addition to interest payment, however, many borrowers 
were required to pay application fees, filing fees, loan regis-
tration fees, and also visit the bank a number of times to nego-
tiate the loan. For new and small borrowers these additional 
loan transactions made up a large part of total borrowing costs. 
On an annualized basis, small borrowers were found to incur 
borrowing costs, as a percent of total amounts borrowed, which 
were similar to "high" interest rates charged by informal 
lenders [1]. 
The expansion of financial facilities into new areas in 
Bangladesh during the past few years has undoubtedly reduced 
the time and travel expenses involved for many rural people to 
~/ Information in this paragraph was drawn from various issues 
of the Bangladesh Bank Bulletin. 
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use formal financial services [2, 32]. Some banks have also 
reduced the number of bank visits required by borrowers and or 
reduced borrower paperwork. A few banks have also used mobile 
banking facilities to bring financial services closer to users. 
Despite these improvements, new and small borrowers still 
complain about the time, effort, and expense associated with 
getting small loans. 
In summary, several laudatory aspects of RFMs in Bangla-
desh can be noted. Most importantly, the rapid expansion of 
financial outlets in rural areas is a very important step for-
ward. Also, the increasing flexibility and willingness of 
policymakers to discuss and experiment with RFM programs and 
policies is a very hopeful sign [6, 7, 10, 21, 24, 25, 29]. 
Despite these bright spots, the performance of RFMs in Bangla-
desh appears to suffer in many of the same ways which can be 
noted in all too many other low-income countries. With signi-
ficant amounts of inflation and relatively inflexible nominal 
interest rates, Bangladesh has not been able to maintain the 
purchasing power of its formal agricultural credit portfolio. 
Despite nationalization of most banks, relatively little of 
the formal credit in the country is going to agriculture and 
the rural poor [26]. Repayment performance, while improving, 
still is unsatisfactory. It is also obvious that the average 
term structure of agricultural loans must be lengthened sub-
stantially if rural financial needs are to be more adequately 
met. It also is apparent that RFMs in Bangladesh are mobilizing 
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too few savings and also imposing too many loan and deposit 
transaction costs on rural poor. 
Future Policy Strategies 
Major increases in the amounts of funds handled by, and 
the coverage of, formal RFMs will be needed to support signi-
ficant rural development in Bangladesh. It is clear, however, 
that the current poor performance of RFMs in Bangladesh cannot 
be resolved through any simple solution. In large part, finan-
cial intermediation follows rather than leads development. In 
part, RFMs are struggling because of the limited amounts of 
financial transactions in a terribly poor country. Despite 
the obvious limitations which current low incomes place on 
RFM growth, we feel that several policy changes might lead to 
substantially improved RFM performance in the near future. 
A brief outline of these suggestions follow. 
Most importantly, policymakers in Bangladesh should expect 
RFMs to play a more comprehensive development role than being 
simple retail outlets for central bank money. In the medium 
to long-run, restricting RFMs to this limited role will be 
anti-developmental; availability of concessionary priced funds 
from the central bank give lenders little incentive to mobilize 
voluntary private savings. In a country like Bangladesh, gov-
ernment and industrial firms contribute a relatively small part 
to overall capital in the society. The key savings-consumption 
deicisions are made by millions of households, most of which 
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are located in rural areas. Policymakers must be very careful 
and creative in designing policies which provide very strong 
incentives for these primary producers of capital to defer 
consumption. RFMs should play an important role in providing 
some of those incentives as well as inexpensive deposit oppor-
tunities for savers. 
On the loan side, policymakers should be more concerned 
about how formal lending activities affect income and asset 
ownership distribution [6, 31]. Concessionary interest rates 
on loans are no bargain for the rural poor if they do not get 
loans, or if formal lenders force the poor to incur substantial 
loan transaction costs. Also, the poor are not better off if 
the well-to-do are the ones doing most of the defaulting on 
formal loans in rural areas. 
Policymakers in Bangladesh should also be more concerned 
with defragmenting rural financial markets. While some geo-
graphic concentration is desirable by lenders, it appears that 
too much emphasis is currently being placed on segmenting 
borrowers. Resources would be more efficiently allocated if 
formal lenders extended loans to any eligible borrower who could 
reasonably be expected to repay the loan, and who is located in 
the lender's service area. Loans to small nonfarm business 
firms in rural areas may, in fact) result in more additional 
income for rural poor than loans to small farmers [19]. 
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If RFMs are to play a more comprehensive role in Bangla-
desh's development, significant policy changes will be necessary. 
Flexible interest rates could play a pivotal role in these 
changes. It is becoming increasingly apparent in most low-
income countries that negative real rates of interest are in-
timately associated with many of the maladies which plague 
RFMs. The purchasing power of credit portfolios are eroded by 
negative real interest rates, and formal lenders have little 
incentive to lend to agriculture or small rural borrowers 
when interest rates are low. Lenders can expect to realize 
larger economic surpluses by lending to less risky nonagricul-
tural enterprises and also concentrating on large loans where 
lender costs per unit of money lent is minimized. Administra-
tive fiats from the capital city do little to alter the lenders' 
perceptions of these economic realities. 
Low, and especially negative, real rates of interest also 
cripple the ability of RFMs to mobilize significant amounts 
of voluntary private savings. This further limits the ability 
of RFMs to increase loan supplies through deposit expansion. 
One might also argue that it will be difficult to improve loan 
repayment records in Bangladesh until "government money" makes 
up a much smaller portion of loanable funds. It is much less 
socially acceptable to abscond with loans if local private sav-
ings make up a significant part of monies lent. It will also 
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be easier for RFMs to provide more financial services which 
are less costly for users in rural areas if the volume of 
savings and loans are sharply expanded. More flexible inter-
est rate policies could allow this to happen more quickly. 
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